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This is a wrongful death action brought against the State of Idaho and its 
Department of Fish & Game (collectively "Fish & Game") pursuant to the Idaho 
Tort Claims Act; plaintiffs' son was killed in a helicopter accident caused by the 
negligent conduct of a Fish & Game employee. The other appeal concerns merits 
issues; this appeal is limited to whether the district court had the authority to assess 
fees and costs against Fish & Game. 
Proceedings Below 
K..rinitt adopts and incorporates by reference the description of the proceeding 
below from his opening brief in the consolidated appeal. Fish & Game's description 
goes too far in supposing that the entry of summary judgment in July 2014 vacates the 
already passed deadlines in the scheduling order - certainly there is no language in the 
district court's 2014 summary judgment ruling, consequent judgment, or this Court's 
2015 opinion from which this can be derived. 
}._RGU1v1ENT 
This appeal is much more limited in scope than the other appeal with which it 
has been consolidated. Here, the sole issue is whether the district court abused its 
1 
in awarding costs and fees to Krinitt as a consequence of & 
to costs 
and fees when motions are filed untimely. Instead, it argues that its motion for 
summary judgment, filed years into the case, was not untimelv. It offers essentiallv 
~ , ..__,.. ., ~ ,I ,/ 
two bases for this contention: (1) that the court-ordered deadline for filing motions 
for summary judgment had been vacated, retroactively, by this Court; and (2) that 
because statutory employer immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, it can 
be raised at any time. 
I. Standard of Review 
Fish & Game has correctly stated the standard of review here: it bears the 
heavy burden of shO\ving that the district court, which openly discussed its exercise of 
discretion in making the award, abused that discretion in finding that the equities 
required an award of costs and fees. F&G Br. at 5 (citing Sun Vallry Shopping Ctr. v. 
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87 (1991), and Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658 (1982)). 
II. The 2013 Scheduling Order was not Vacated 
This district court entered a scheduling order in February 2013. Neither party 
appealed the order, either when it was entered or during the earlier appeal of this case, 
or, for that matter, now. This Court was not asked to pass upon any past provisions 
2 
on past effect a modification 
not 
was 
Based on no text of any order of any court, including this Court, Fish & Game 
contends that appellate review automatically vacates all prior orders entered by the 
district court, not only the ruling that has been appealed and vacated, but with respect 
to other orders e.g., setting past deadlines as well. It cites no authority for this 
extraordinary proposition. The district court understood that a remand from this 
Court gives rise to the need for (and it in fact decreed) a new trial date1 - the prior 
date having passed while the appeal was pending - but no provision of the rules, nor 
any authority Fish & Game can point to, should have lead the district court to 
conclude that all its prior orders, including those that had not been appealed or passed 
upon by this Court, were also vacated. 
The district court nonetheless allowed Fish & Game to file its motion out of 
time. Whether this was error is the subject of the other case in this consolidated 
appeal. Here, Fish & Game has the burden of showing that the district court erred in 
1 Obviously, also, the parties would need new deadlines for submitting jury instructions, exhibit lists, 
and other items that are resolved at the final pretrial conference. The conclusion of expert discovery 
- that is, depositions of experts whose reports had already been filed - was subject to an informal 
understanding of counsel, which both parties were prepared to honor. Completion of work that 
would have followed disposition of the 2014 summary judgment motion, had it been denied, has 
nothing to do with whether the case resets completely to its outset, with all orders vacated, as an 
incident of appellate remand. 
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that remain in effect, as explicitly has 
Statutory Employer Immunity 1s an Affirmative Defense, and is not a 
Question of Subject 1\!latter Jurisdiction 
On this issue, the Court could not have been clearer in its holding in Ftthriman 
v. State, 143 Idaho 800 (2007): statutory employer immunity is an affirmative defense. 
Id. at 803. The Court explicitly limited the time during which this defense could be 
raised, id. at 804, which it has never done, as a matter of law, with respect to subject 
matter jurisdiction.2 Nothing about the holding in Ftthriman suggests, even remotely, 
that this affirmative defense is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Cases from this Court concerning statutory employer immunity are, to a one, 
reviews of the grant of a summary judgment motion. See Ewing v. DOT, 147 Idaho 
305 (2009); Bia/av. Starr, 146 Idaho 847 (2009); Cordova v. Bonneville 6 Joint Sch. Dist. 
No. 93, 144 Idaho 637 (2007); Kellar v. Cassia Cottnry, 142 Idaho 346 (2005); Gonzalez v. 
Lamb Westan Inc., 142 Idaho 120 (2005); Venters v. Sorreato Det., Inc., 141 Idaho 245 
(2005); Robinson v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207 (2003); Lines v. Idaho Forest Indtts., 
2 The district court considered the interesting hypothetical question whether it could set a date for 
motions raising subject matter jurisdiction. Tr. at 30-31. Having reflected on the issue, Krinitt 
would suggest that the proper answer is as follows: in the interest of having cases proceed in an 
orderly fashion, the district court can set a deadline for such motions, with the understanding that 
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Where there is an untimely motion, the award of costs 
and fees this district court might well be the proper remedy. Rule 8 may not detail the consequences 
for filing out of time, see Guzman v. Perry, 155 Idaho 928, 935 (2014), but, as this case illustrates, Rule 
16 provides the district court with specific tools, even when a contention cannot be waived by late 
assertion. 
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(1994); Rhodes v. 13 1 987). a single 
matter 
consequently not an abuse of discretion for the district court to take this Court at its 
word, and find that statutory immunity was an affirmative defense that had to be 
raised in a timely fashion, just like other affirmative defenses. It was correct in its 
conclusion that Fish & Game's motion was not timely. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those presented in its opening brief in the 
consolidated case, Krinitt requests that the judgment of the district court be reversed, 
that the case be remanded to the district court with instructions to deny Fish & 
Game's motion for summary judgment, and to set the matter for trial. In the 
alternative, if the Court is not persuaded to overturn the summary judgment, I<rinitt 
requests that the district court's decision to award costs and fees be affirmed. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2017. 
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